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**1962/11/07**

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3/19/83

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
**AIRGRAM**

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1-762  
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**POLTO A-517**

TO : SECSTATE WASHINGTON PASS DEFENSE

INFO: ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS AND MOSCOW

COPY NO. 27-53 SERIES 6

DATE: November 7, 1962

FROM : USRO PARIS

SUBJECT : PRIVATE NAC MEETING NOV. 7 RE CUBA

REF :

Following summary rather full and fruitful PermReps plus one NAC meeting 7th on Cuba.

I opened discussion by giving points POLTO 534 on US present negotiating position, gist of TOPOL 594 outlining reasons must remain on guard despite amelioration Cuban situation and need Council to keep plans up to date, gist of TOPOL 598 telling of US staff studies and suggestions of others to do same so that can have meaningful NAC exchange on future developments, as well as highlights TOPOLs 599 and 603 giving Latin American reaction and preferred quarantine aid.

UN then followed with general assessment by FO who assume Department has in detail. Following highlights remarks. Soviets unable to overcome US lead in nuclear weapons despite heavy military budget increases, and therefore Khrushchev decided try redress balance by Cuban missile venture, which UN believes approved by entire Politburo. Soviets believed only real risk was possibility detection while materiel being landed and this miscalculated that US would do nothing more than protest to UN once we learned missiles operational. US acted properly in putting full onus on Khrushchev, not Castro, and making clear this straight US-USSR confrontation in which, because US strength forced Khrushchev back down. One question remains why public offer Oct. 27 trade Cuban for Turkish missiles. Was this second thought by Politburo or Khrushchev alone? Probably offer made against better judgement, but decided try to see if would work. Firm White House turn-down killed offer.

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UK stated while Soviets have not put pressure or pointedly mentioned Berlin since height Cuban crisis, this does not mean they may not in long run step up pressure there. He noted Khrushchev trying recoup some political prestige by claiming he won his main point by US promise not invade Cuba and claiming to world that he is man of peace. Nevertheless, Khrushchev's position may be weakened in Communist bloc and possibly at home, and in future effectiveness of Khrushchev's threats to use force will be less effective. But all must be aware retreat on exposed position Cuba does not mean Soviets will retreat other areas where their vital interests involved. UK also urged other NAC members give their assessments.

Canada stated it important US insist upon full verification dismantling before paying any attention to any Castro points. He added Canadian Government evaluation similar to US and UK that Khrushchev fully aware dangers nuclear war and US nuclear superiority, which he tried overcome by use Cuba. He agreed Khrushchev trying regain some prestige by posing as man of peace and having obtained guaranty no invasion Cuba. Mikoyan's visit not clear since he may be using Castro's intransigence to delay while missiles being taken out and trying to assure Castro that Soviet Union still backing him by promising more economic aid. Canada feels neutral countries may have been shocked and somewhat awakened by cavalier way Soviets treated Cuba and also by continuing Chinese aggression against India. He ended up by pleading that now is time to follow policy of trying to attain settlement of all important outstanding E/W questions.

Italy agreed with US-UK evaluation and particularly welcomed idea of further consultation as to future developments.

Dutch then gave rather long, official evaluation covering five points:

1) They concerned about eventual effect of statement in President's Oct. 27 letter, i.e. "give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be willing to do likewise". Dutch believe this may be considered insurance policy by Castro and encourage him carry on effective subversive activities throughout LA such as bombing Venezuelan oil, and any efforts made by US or other LA countries to stop this will play into Soviets propaganda hands by permitting them to claim US and LA partners have not lived up to promises.

2) Dutch somewhat concerned by implication in Khrushchev's Oct. 27 letter re Cuba-Turkish missile deal to effect both Cuba and Turkey must give permission for inspection teams to visit countries in order verify dismantling. This idea may be used by Soviets to back Cuba's refusal to permit inspection unless tied in with some Turkish deal.

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3) Dutch question whether there is real conflict between Kremlin and Castro's five points, since Soviets probably used latter to own ends, since Kremlin has not, in fact, changed its attitude or goals but has only modified them. This borne out by fact that Canada and others first believed Kremlin had accepted international verification and control of dismantling, but it now clear they have not changed position this score. Dutch believe Soviets stalling by using informal UN discussion to give them time to dismantle missiles so no foreigners can see them.

4) Dutch uncertain as to degree "independence" Castro but inclined to believe Castro still not under full Soviet control, that Mikoyan has come there to explain why Soviets had to change course suddenly and assure Cuba of full Soviet support by offering additional economic, political and military aid in future. Dutch even suspect a Soviet-Cuban defense treaty exists. Mikoyan staying Cuba ostensibly try persuade Castro accept Khrushchev's agreement with President but is doing this again to gain time so missiles can all be removed or hidden before any inspection takes place. Dutch PermRep then asked on behalf his Government whether US had given full consideration and study to possibility that missiles may be buried or otherwise carefully hidden.

5) Regarding future, there are no indications that Soviet basic goals have changed one bit. While it may be hard for them at moment to swallow Cuban set-back, Soviets will dream up other moves which will be harder to combat. While Dutch do not believe Soviets will move on Berlin immediately, they will in long run, and therefore it is most important for us to study all political and economic implications Berlin question in order be prepared for all contingencies.

Belgium agreed with US-UK evaluation which were in line with Spaak's. He warned that ~~nothing~~ had really changed as far as Soviet goals and tactics are concerned but that maybe (because of Cuban reverses) what may have been unanimous Presidium decision may have given way, because of Cuban reverses, to split in Politburo. Therefore, in future NAC should avoid action which will play into hands of what now may be possible "tough" Presidium group. Belgian PermRep stated Spaak believed would be very difficult for Khrushchev to take aggressive action Berlin near future because to do so on top of Cuban aggression would make it clear to all that Khrushchev a real aggressive international bandit. Therefore, probably Presidium reconsidering Berlin situation in light Cuban reverse. He stated US position quite correct that must verify complete removal of missiles before discussing other matters. In meantime all should take up US offer to do staff work so that discussion of future developments can take place soonest. However, since US closest to recent developments, hoped US could give NAC benefit its staff

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work: soonest. Belgian felt President's Oct. 27th letter to Khrushchev should be a "charter for future." First, Cuban threat must be satisfactorily eliminated and secondly, should take up President's suggestion to be prepared "to discuss a detente affecting NATO and Warsaw Pacts". He felt that Warsaw-NATO confrontation should not be limited to Berlin or Germany but cover broad spectrum problems: disarmament; test bans, etc. He reminded US Nitze had talked of detailed studies being worked out by Ambassadorial Group and wondered whether US ready to make these available for discussion in NAC. He added that if completion of studies will take considerable more time perfect, might be best NAC to discuss these questions now and thus take advantage of dynamism caused by Soviet-Cuban reverses.

Greek reported Greek Ambassador Moscow felt Soviets would now try to find weak spots in Western positions and put pressure on these spots to disrupt Alliance. Therefore it essential NATO reinforce military and political weak spots.

In reply to Turkish question, Belgian said broad confrontation should deal with any subject any member Alliance thought important and hoped that Ambassadorial Group make available its thinking soonest.

Portugal, noting LA solidarity, expressed hope that efforts would be made to maintain this since were definite indications Soviets trying to develop pacifist elements that area.

Acting Secretary General Colonna summed up by stating concensus Council was to follow through on Belgian suggestion, keep up dynamism, see what results could come from broad confrontation and that all NAC members seemed to agree no real change in Soviet policy. He then reminded Council he had suggested a meeting in near future be devoted primarily discussion political developments, particularly Berlin, and suggested such discussion Nov. 14th or 16th, at which time NATO Alert questions would also be discussed.

UK concluded this part of discussion by agreeing that while discussion Berlin political question important, would be most useful, after various assessments of Cuban developments given in NAC today, for Council to continue debate on this subject by asking questions on the various assessments and trying to come up with a consensus as to what to do in future.

FINLETTER

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